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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of  Brexit on financial services regulation in relation to three areas linked
to executive remuneration. They are: the bonus cap; the clawback of  pay; and the level of  disclosure required
by shareholders with regard to details of  directors’ remuneration. It will be argued that legally Brexit will
have little impact on any of  the three areas. UK legislation has already incorporated a great deal of  EU
legislation. The status quo of  retaining such legal restrictions seems sensible in light of  public sentiment
towards unfairness in executive compensation and uncertainty towards the Brexit negotiations. Nevertheless,
London faces stiff  competition from other major international financial centres in a post-Brexit era. The
loss of  single passporting rights is also encouraging major banks to invest in other European financial
centres. Brexit creates opportunities too. With the integration of  digital technology, it is possible to create
convenient platforms where investors can access reports on executive remuneration.
Keywords: Brexit; bonus cap; clawback provision; corporate governance; disclosure
requirements; executive remuneration; shareholder engagement.
1 Introduction
‘Brexit means Brexit’ was possibly the most common catchphrase of  2016. That was theyear Britain voted to leave the European Union (EU). Against the Brexit backdrop,
there is great uncertainty about the precise future of  a number of  factors within the UK
financial sector. One of  them is executive remuneration. The controversy over executive
pay has been around for some time: for years we have been told that banks and other
financial institutions over-reward their staff. We have also been told that ill-thought-out
remuneration designs can lead to unfair transfers of  value from companies, their
shareholders and other stakeholders to executives, and they can also affect companies’ long-
term sustainability.1 For this reason, in order to transform the bonus and excessive pay
culture of  European Banks, the European Commission has adopted a number of  critical
measures over the past few years.2 These have proven popular on a continent struggling to
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1     L Bebchuk and J Fried, ‘Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of  Executive Compensation’
(Harvard University Press 2004); S Thompson, ‘Executive Pay and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK:
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2     Commission Recommendations 2004/913/EC, 2005/162/EC, 2009/385/EC (2013/36/EU) (CRD).
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emerge from the ruins of  the recent and most catastrophic financial crisis. However, there
is now great concern over the fate of  the UK remuneration and bonus policies, particularly
within the City of  London; a city where the pay and bonus culture is a breeding ground for
controversy and where the predominant remuneration ‘ethos’ is often viewed as a
contributing factor for reckless and excessive risk-taking.3 The reason for the concern is
this: Europe has heavily influenced the UK’s domestic rules, such as the malus provisions,
bonus clawback and bonus caps. In fact, the UK Remuneration Codes derive much of  their
current form from the European regulations.4 Topical and crucial questions therefore are:
what will the UK’s exit from the EU mean for the country’s remuneration policies? Does
the EU continue to influence the way UK-based firms remunerate their high-level
employees and, if  so, what would change following the public’s decision to leave the EU?
It could be said that there are two sides to the same coin here. 
On the one hand, in the UK’s current political climate there is probably little appetite
for introducing changes to the remuneration rules. There is a plethora of  reasons for this.
To start with, despite a succession of  rules aimed at curtailing excessive rewards
(particularly since the emergence of  the 2008 financial crisis), there has not been a
noteworthy decrease in senior executives’ pay. On the contrary, pay has continued to
increase despite the so-called shareholder spring of  2012.5 Furthermore, businesses have
dedicated significant time and effort adjusting to new rules and legislation. There is also
the need to consider the impact that drastic changes can have on the investor community:
irrespective of  Brexit, investors need to feel confident that they operate within a
favourable investment climate; any existing rules that help enhance investor confidence
will not be abandoned so hastily. Britain is not experiencing the appropriate political
climate that would justify deserting policies that target poor remuneration policies and
designs. Progressive measures have entered EU and UK law as part of  a wider overhaul
of  capital rules in order to help strengthen investor protection, bring more stability into
the banking system and reduce risky speculation. Why would the UK government want
to deviate from the existing rules and willingly agreeing to undergo an extensive revision
of  its remuneration laws and regulations? 
But there is also the other side of  the coin. The side that suggests that Brexit can
provide the perfect opportunity for the City to shine. Industry participants would argue
that Britain can benefit from freeing itself  of  certain EU regulations, particularly those
that the City did not want in the first place. Some of  the more unwelcome areas of  EU
regulation, such as the controversial bankers’ bonus cap under the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD) IV (2013/36/EU), could be altered or scrapped altogether and Brexit
could finally grant Britain the chance to expand its global footprint without the need to
obey a tsunami of  EU directives. 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69(2)108
3     A Lui, ‘Greed, Recklessness and/or Dishonesty? An Investigation into the Culture Of  five UK Banks between
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4     These are implemented in the UK through the FCA Remuneration Code, which makes recommendations on
the structure of  remuneration for risk-taking staff  and requires aggregate disclosure of  amounts paid to these
staff: FCA Remuneration Code, FSA’s Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC)
sourcebook <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC/3/>.
5     According to the latest data from the High Pay Centre, Britain’s top executives have continued to receive pay
rises despite greater scrutiny of  executive rewards. The average pay for a FTSE 100 CEO rose to £5.480
million in 2015, an increase from £4.964 million in 2014 and significantly higher than the £4.129 million in
2010. The calculation was based on the ‘single figure’ pay disclosure of  62 top-flight firms that have published
their remuneration reports for the 2015 financial year. This ‘single figure’ comprises the executive salary,
bonus, long-term incentives and pensions: ‘The State of  Pay: High Pay Centre Briefing on Executive Pay’
(2016) <http://highpaycentre.org/files/The_State_of_Pay_2015.pdf>. 
This article will focus on the possible impacts of  Brexit on financial services
regulation in relation to three areas linked to executive remuneration: the capping of
banker’s bonuses, a policy pushed forward by the Europeans as part of  their most
comprehensive banking reforms to date; the clawback of  pay, by which money already
paid is returned under certain conditions; and finally the level of  disclosure required by
shareholders regarding details of  directors’ remuneration and the extent to which
shareholder approval is needed. The key question is whether these European initiatives
can survive the Brexit currents or whether their ‘demolition’ will eventually prove
unavoidable. 
2 Britain: be aware of Brexit?
There is a firm framework in Europe regulating executive remuneration that mitigates the
impact of  excessive risk-taking. The EU regulators made a direct attempt to eradicate
‘rewards for failure‘ in the financial sector through a variety of  measures. Central to these
is the CRD IV which is directly applicable to firms across the EU and implemented
through national law and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).6 The purpose of
the CRD IV package is to provide a ‘single rulebook’ across the EU covering regulatory
capital requirements, corporate governance and penalties. CRD IV brings the EU into line
with the Basel III rules on banking standards, which introduce greater requirements for
the quality and quantity of  capital, new rules for counterparty risk, new liquidity and
leverage requirements, and new macroprudential standards including a countercyclical
capital buffer and capital buffers for institutions that have systematically demonstrated
their significance. They also contain changes to rules on corporate governance, including
remuneration, and introduce standardised EU regulatory reporting.7 According to the
CRD IV, banks and investment firms must implement remuneration policies that are
consistent with effective risk management. Remuneration policies must not promote risk-
taking that surpasses the level of  accepted risk of  a particular institution. In addition, a
clear distinction must be drawn between the criteria for setting fixed and variable pay:
fixed remuneration must be permanent, predetermined, non-discretionary and non-
revocable, whilst variable pay must depend on performance. Institutions must be in a
position to explain and justify to their stakeholders the use of  any variable remuneration
component. These rules are binding on all EU member states and apply to all EU banks,
the EU operations of  foreign banks and institutions, and third-country subsidiaries of
EU banks (but largely not to hedge funds, which are governed by separate legislation).
They give the right to national banks and financial supervisory authorities to take action
against any financial institution that fails to comply and allow national supervisors to
impose penalties either to restrain discovered breaches of  the new rules or to remedy
their causes.
Significantly, central to the directive’s measures are ‘malus’ (the adjustment of  an
award of  variable remuneration before it has vested), ‘clawback’ (the return of  money
already paid to employees under certain conditions), ‘bonus caps’ (capping the bonus
payments of  senior staff  in financial institutions) and, last but not least, ‘remuneration
disclosure’ (the level of  disclosure required by shareholders regarding details of  directors’
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7     Basel III is an overhaul of  banking rules and the biggest shake-up of  the banking system since the global
financial crisis. Before its implementation, the lack of  solid financial cushions meant that many banks were at
risk, requiring taxpayer-funded bailouts to avoid collapse. Basel III focuses on a ratio of  high-quality capital –
called tier 1, which is needed to protect it against any future shocks. The high-quality capital will increase to 9
per cent after the rules come into effect: Commission Recommendations (n 2). 
remuneration and the extent to which shareholder approval is needed). In looking at these
measures in more detail, unless otherwise specified, up to 100 per cent of  variable pay
must be subject to malus or clawback arrangements, a particularly useful tool in
circumstances where the employee took part or was responsible for conduct resulting in
significant losses to his/her institution or failed to adhere to the appropriate standards of
fitness and propriety. In addition, bankers’ bonuses are to be capped; the maximum pay-
out is set at a year’s salary, and this can increase to two years’ salary with shareholder
approval.8 In other words, provided two-thirds of  shareholders approve, bonuses for
regulated staff  are capped at 200 per cent of  salary; in the absence of  such an agreement
bonuses are capped at 100 per cent of  salary. The other area of  executive remuneration
addressed by the EU is disclosure of  directors’ remuneration: a European Shareholder
Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) and new EU rules extend shareholders’ right to vote
under the ‘say-on-pay’ provisions.9
Britain derives its rules on executive pay from domestic as well as EU legislation.10
Matters related to executive remuneration were first given attention in 1995 following a
period of  public dissatisfaction on the levels of  directors’ pay. The result was the Greenbury
Code Directors’ Remuneration, Report of  a Study Group,11 which recommended
establishing remuneration committees of  non-executive directors to decide on levels of
remuneration and on particular pay packages. The aim was to introduce an element of
independence in deciding the level of  the executive’s pay. The report’s recommendations
were later incorporated into the UK Listing Rules and the UK Corporate Governance Code
2012.12 Crucially, the last few years have seen an explosion of  reforms to the regulation of
the UK’s financial industries, including changes to remuneration and bonuses rewarded to
executives of  large financial institutions. These reforms were heavily influenced by the EU;
it is EU initiatives that have affected the domestic requirements (such as the clawback and
malus provisions) of  the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Investment
Association’s principles of  remuneration. The current UK Remuneration Codes13 derive
much of  their present form from European legislative packages and regulations, particularly
CRD IV, and the practical details of  CRD IV are set out in the revised SYSC Remuneration
Code.14 Importantly, all UK banks and building societies (and some investment firms) are
also subject to the requirements of  CRD IV. 
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8     The agreement is on a mandatory 1:1 ratio on salary relative to variable pay, which can rise to 2:1 with explicit
shareholder approval. 
9     The new EU rules extending shareholders’ right to vote under the say-on-pay provisions are to be found in
Directive (EU) 2017/828 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 May 2017, amending
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of  long-term shareholder engagement. 
10   There are currently over 100,000 items of  UK legislation in the UK which have their origins in EU treaties.
It is not clear whether these pieces of  legislation will remain as they are, be repealed, or come to an end as a
result of  Brexit. What happens next is a question the UK Parliament will inevitably face in the years to come. 
11   Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (1995).
12   UK Corporate Governance Code (2012), s D.
13   There are five Remuneration Codes in the UK tailored to different types of  firm: SYSC 19A – IFPRU
Remuneration Code; SYSC 19B – AIFM Remuneration Code; SYSC 19C – BIPRU Remuneration Code;
SYSC 19D – Dual-regulated Firms Remuneration Code; SYSC 19E – UCITS Remuneration Code. The Codes
apply to more than 3000 firms, including banks, building societies, large full-scope UK alternative investment
fund managers, CRD investment firms such as broker-dealers, investment managers, corporate finance,
private equity and venture capital firms, and operators of  multilateral trading facilities and management
companies of  undertakings in collective investments in transferrable securities.
14   In recent years, we have seen the implementation of  CRD III and IV, AIFMD, UCITSv and Solvency II, all
of  which encompass regulation linked to remuneration. These rules that have already been implemented in
UK regulation.
And yet, the future of  many of  the aforementioned areas remains uncertain following
Brexit. Uncertainty is not a welcome prospect; the health of  the UK economy largely
depends on the design of  its financial services industry, an industry that accounts for
approximately 8 per cent of  UK gross domestic product (GDP). In this regard, in the
short-to-medium term nothing will change. Still, what happens next matters greatly.
Following the country’s notice of  its exit, a transitional period will follow, during which
the UK’s future relationship with the EU will be negotiated. Where EU law has been
incorporated into primary UK legislation no change will happen. But under the terms of
the European Communities Act 1972, EU law can take the form of  secondary legislation;
such secondary legislation can fall away unless deliberately retained. According to a
detailed briefing published by the House of  Commons Library concerning the process
for the UK leaving the EU, there are provisions of  the CRD IV that do not derive from
Basel III proposals, but rather from the EU’s own policy; amongst these are those relating
to corporate governance and remuneration. Upon Brexit, the UK will be free to rid itself
of  any unwanted provisions without deviating from the Basel III requirements. This
means that the aforesaid European-inspired steps, solid as they are, might not survive the
Brexit currents; some parts of  EU regulation could be altered or scrapped altogether. 
The following section will examine three key areas of  the UK corporate governance
framework that are derived directly from EU initiatives – namely, clawback, caps on
bonuses and remuneration disclosure – and will consider whether their post-Brexit
‘evaporation’ is at all likely.15
2.1 BREXIT AND ITS IMPACT ON ‘CLAWBACK’
A clawback provision is a special contractual clause by which money already paid to
employees must be paid back under certain conditions. Put simply, clawback makes
someone give something back. In the employment context, it is triggered when an
employer claims repayment of  remuneration which has already been paid to an employee
upon the happening of  specified circumstances. In practice, this normally relates to the
repayment of  cash, stock or other assets already awarded to an employee. An invaluable
tool, it permits firms to instruct executives to return their bonuses under the presence of
specific conditions. Bonuses are normally given annually in cash, and frequently in the
City of  London big parts of  bonuses are paid under a different type of  arrangement,
commonly referred to as the ‘deferred incentive plan’. It is these deferred incentive plans
that, in practice, are being clawed back. What this means is that performance is measured
over a period of  time with the bonus being delayed accordingly, thereby granting the
employee an incentive to perform well within a specific role. Where a bonus is paid on
the basis of  performance which subsequently turns out to have been miscalculated, it can
be clawed back. This happened recently when directors of  Lloyds Bank were asked to
return large parts of  their bonuses as a result of  the bank’s decision to pay compensation
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15   For an excellent discussion on the remuneration policies in the EU, see Ellis Ferran, ‘Crisis-driven Regulatory
Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going?’ in E Ferran, N Moloney, J G Hill and J C Coffee Jr (eds), The
Regulatory Aftermath of  the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2012); Guido Ferrarini and Niamh
Moloney, ‘Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform’ (2005) 21 Oxford Review of
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Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective (Oxford University Press 2013) 92.
For a more general discussion, see Jaap Winter, ‘Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive
Remuneration Built to Fail’ in Thomas and Hill (n 1); D Arsalidou, Rethinking Corporate Governance in
Financial Institutions (Routledge 2015). For a thorough discussion of  executive remuneration in the UK and
its theoretical underpinnings, see M Petrin, ‘Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom – Past, Present,
and Future’ (2015) 36(7) The Company Lawyer 196; D Arsalidou, ‘The Regulation of  Executive Pay and
Economic Theory (2011) 5 Journal of  Business Law 431.
in excess of  £3.2 billion to customers who were wrongly sold payment protection
insurance.16
In the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of  2014, a significant amendment was
introduced by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC): firms are now required to include
provisions enabling performance adjustment or post-vesting clawback for the variable pay
of  executive directors (including bonuses and long-term incentives). Firms must also
include details of  the exact circumstances that entitle remuneration committees to act,
should they deem necessary. This marks a crucial change from the wording of  the
previous Corporate Governance Code that granted remuneration committees the power
to act ‘in exceptional circumstances of  misstatement or misconduct’. Now, it is up to
individual companies to determine the circumstances that would justify interference by
their remuneration committees. As a consequence, many companies will need to
strengthen their policies. Even though the majority of  companies already have measures
in place concerning the clawback of  pay under specified conditions, not many include
provisions regarding the clawing back of  payments already granted. With the toughening-
up of  the clawback rules, firms are required to define their policies in relation to issues
such as the precise circumstances that would provoke clawback, the time limit of  the
clawback risk and how variable deferred pay should be designed in order to ensure that
sums are withheld or recovered. Crucially also, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA)
has recently issued a final policy statement on bonus clawback, together with an
instrument making various changes to the Remuneration Code. With effect from
1 January 2015, PRA-authorised firms have been required to amend their employment
contracts to ensure that bonuses which have already been paid to their employees can be
clawed back where necessary.17 In particular, they are required to clawback bonuses where
there is evidence of  employee misbehaviour; where the firm or relevant business unit
suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or where the firm or relevant
business unit suffers a material failure of  risk management. In addition, firms must set
the specific criteria for the application of  malus and clawback and must also ensure that
the criteria for the application of  malus and clawback include instances where the
employee took part in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses
to the firm, or behaved in a way which failed to meet the appropriate standards of  fitness
and propriety.18
There remain a number of  pending questions, particularly in relation to the scope and
enforceability of  clawback provisions. In addition, there are outstanding technical
matters, such as how non-cash bonus awards are valued or whether clawback applies to
the gross or net value of  bonus awards. There are a number of  sensitive issues too, such
as which firms should be entitled to retrieve bonuses, as well as some controversial
questions, such as the exact circumstances that should entitle firms to retrieve vested and
paid bonuses, especially in relation to those granted seven to ten years earlier.
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16   Attracta Mooney, ‘UK Fund Executives’ Pay Slashed: Brexit, Fund Outflows and Declining Profitability Put
Pressure on Remuneration in 2016’ Financial Times (London, 9 April 2017) 8.
17   The PRA, created as a part of  the Bank of  England by the Financial Services Act (2012), is responsible for
the prudential regulation and supervision of  around 1700 banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and
major investment firms. The objectives of  the PRA are set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
It has three statutory objectives:
       1. a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of  the firms it regulates;
2. an objective specific to insurance firms, to contribute to the securing of  an appropriate degree of
protection for those who are or may become insurance policyholders; and 
       3. a secondary objective to facilitate effective competition.
18   PRA, r 15.21.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, there has been some opposition to use of  clawback as an
effective governance tool; for instance, the British Bankers’ Association challenged this
practice primarily on the grounds that it is unfair and potentially unenforceable. It
suggested that introducing changes to employment contracts retrospectively, violates
employment law in countries where UK banks function and operate. It also claimed that
such a policy can destroy results-based pay, causing an increase in the overall pay awarded
to executive directors.19
Still, there has not been much opposition to clawback, especially compared to
numerous other corporate governance measures and initiatives. In fact, despite the
controversies and outstanding technical questions, clawback provisions are now well
embedded within the UK corporate governance ethos; the UK Corporate Governance
Code firmly incorporates the requirement for malus and clawback in relation to executive
variable pay (particularly bonuses and share plans) for all UK listed companies. Crucially,
there is a high compliance level with the principles of  the Code, and within this high level
clawback clearly stands out. According to a 2017 survey examining the compliance of
UK-based banks with the corporate governance principles, the majority of  FTSE 350
have implemented a rule that companies must adopt the necessary arrangements to
permit them to recover or withhold variable pay. The figures paint a positive picture here:
91 per cent have already adopted a clawback provision that is linked to the annual bonuses
awarded to executives, and 78 per cent have adopted a clawback provision linked to their
long-term plans.20
All in all, amongst the many measures adopted by the FRC to transform the bonus
and excessive pay culture of  the UK, clawback plays a crucial part.21 In fact, there is clear
enthusiasm to improve and move forward with this provision, as shown by the fact that
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), in a bid to combat misconduct, is considering
mirroring the PRA’s clawback scheme with respect to FCA-regulated firms and also
extending clawback to bankers’ basic salaries (as opposed to solely bonuses).22 Designed
properly, this practice can act as an imperative device for corporate accountability. The
appetite here is for strengthening rather than weeding out the clawback provision.23
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19   ‘BBA response to Prudential Regulation Authority consultation on Clawback CP6/14’
<www.BritishBankers’Association+clawback> ??LINK BROKEN??. 
20   Corporate Governance Review <www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-
kingdom/pdf/publication/corporate-governance-review-2017.pdf>. The review includes a comprehensive
analysis of  the annual reports of  the companies in the FTSE 350 and covers 305 FTSE 350 companies.
Amongst other matters, it assesses compliance with the disclosure requirements of  the UK Corporate
Governance Code 2016 (and 2014 where applicable), considers the quality and detail of  explanations, and
draws attention to best practice and emerging trends in narrative reporting. 
21   Others would include boardroom diversity and the disclosure of  long-term viability statements.
22   As Wheatley explains, this is primarily so due to the fact that there is a tendency for employers to pay their
employees higher basic salaries – a direct consequence of  the CRD IV bonus cap. PRA-authorised firms must
now ensure that bonuses are subject to clawback for a period of  up to seven years after vesting. However, this
change does not have retrospective effect: it applies only to bonuses awarded on or after 1 January 2015.
Moreover, firms will not have to clawback bonuses where there is a material downturn in financial
performance, but they will where either (i) there is reasonable evidence of  employee misbehaviour or material
error, or (ii) the firm or relevant business unit suffers a material failure of  risk management: Martin Wheatley,
‘FCA Issue Rules and Guidance on Bankers Remuneration and Clawback Obligations’
<https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/comment/blogs/employment-law-blog/fca-issue-rules-and-guidance-
on-bankers-remuneration-and-clawback-obligations> (Kingsley Napley, 10 July 2017).
23   Another indicator that there is appetite for strengthening the provisions lies in a new proposal by the FCA
and PRA that firms should be entitled to extend the clawback period for senior managers for up to 10 years
in the event of  an internal or regulatory investigation.
2.2. BREXIT AND ITS IMPACT ON ‘CAPS ON BONUSES’
Perhaps the most high profile of  Europe’s laws and regulations is the cap on bonuses.24
Adopted in 2014, the cap limits bonuses to 100 per cent of  salary, or 200 per cent with
shareholder approval. This marks a momentous change; previously there was no legal pay
limit on bank executives, who could earn performance bonuses many times their base
salaries. The cap on bonuses is a direct result of  the strong public frustration that had
grown across Europe over excessive pay rewards: excessive bonuses, many endlessly
argue, encourage executives to care very little about the long-term future of  their
institutions.25 Indeed, for many in Europe, bankers, and especially Anglo-Saxon bankers,
are inherently gluttonous, careless and self-seeking. There is a general perception that
there exists a system of  rewards that encourages excessive risk-taking and short-sighted
behaviour with little regard to the damaging effects of  short-term actions. The idea
therefore is that the cap can help suppress these undesirable behavioural traits; it can
discourage excessive risk-taking whilst motivating executives to think carefully and
prudently about the long-term prospects and profitability of  their institutions. 
Nevertheless, the UK banking industry has not been too supportive of  the idea of
imposing a cap on bonuses; for instance, the head of  trading at ETX Capital in London
argued that, as a result of  the cap, banks risk losing their top talent.26 Most crucially, the
UK government made a formidable attempt to oppose its implementation; it argued that
it would be relatively easy to find ways around the restrictions and that, in limiting
bonuses, banks would either raise salaries or come up with alternative ways to pay their
executives.27 Caps on bonuses can easily backfire, driving up fixed salaries to compensate.
Firms that are not obligated to stay within the EU will be incentivised to leave and, when
banks invest in future divisions, the investments will be based outside the EU. It is
therefore important, the government has said, that any new regulation is flexible enough
to permit banks to compete and prosper whilst based in the UK. 
Eventually, Britain had to conform to the established position once statute passed.
Notwithstanding the various challenges from London, the UK failed to garner enough
support to prevent legislation on the issue. In fact, the bonus cap has been in effect since
January 2014. Still, there continues to be plenty of  scepticism towards this policy within
the UK. This is hardly surprising, particularly since the UK hosts Europe’s biggest
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24   For a detailed evaluation of  the ‘problematic’ nature of  the bonus cap, see K Asai, ‘Is Capping Executive
Bonuses Useful?’ (Working Paper, Monetary and Capital Markets 2 WP/16/196 International Monetary Fund
2016); A Kleymenova and I Tuna, ‘Regulation of  Compensation’ (WP 16/07 University of  Chicago Booth
School of  Business 2017) 1. Also see ‘Cap and Flayed – Europe Looks Set to Limit Bank Bonuses’ The
Economist (London, 23 February 2013) 13; Jane DeAnne, ‘The Future of  Executive Pay’ Financial Times
(London, 3 August 2012) 5.
25   For instance, according to a research study examining the effects of  bonuses in 67 European banks, excessive
financial sector bonuses caused banks to earn more in the short term but led to unsustainable risks that
eventually materialised in the financial crisis: Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, Patrick Kampkotter and Johannes
Steinbrecher, ‘Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks’
<www.eeassoc.org/doc/upload/BANK_BONUSES_ENCOURAGED_EXCESSIVE_RISK-TAKING-
_New_evidence_from_the_Austrian,_German_and_Swiss_financial_sectors20150822215351.pdf>. 
26   As stated by Joe Rundle, the head of  trading at ETX Capital in London: see ‘EU Banker Bonus Cap “self
defeating”’ (BBC News, 28 February 2013) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21621045>. 
27   George Osborne, the then Chancellor of  the Exchequer, lodged a complaint in the European Court of  Justice
in 2013, arguing that the EU banker bonus cap is misconceived but conceded defeat a year later when he
abandoned the legal challenge to overturn the cap: Court of  Justice of  the European Union No 154/14, 20
November 2014 <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-11/cp140154en.pdf>. 
financial services centre.28 Nevertheless, London’s position is threatened by the imminent
move of  Morgan Stanley to Frankfurt after Brexit. Other banks, such as Goldman Sachs,
Standard Chartered, Daiwa, Sumitomo Mitsui, Nomura of  Japan, VTB of  Russia and
Woori Bank of  South Korea, will be expanding their Frankfurt offices. Brussels, Dublin
and Paris are also vying for a share of  London’s banking sector.29 The bonus restrictions
could, in the long run at least, cost jobs in the City, pushing financial institutions to
establish themselves in more favourable countries. A self-defeating policy such as this
would see the City of  London’s overseas rivals exploiting this opportunity for their
benefit, undermining EU support in Britain.30 Certainly, from the perspective of  the cap’s
opponents (such as the UK banking industry and the FSA), this is a good time for Britain;
the UK’s exit from the EU could mean that UK-based banks can be freed from the EU’s
heavy and unnecessary restrictions on bonuses. Through Brexit, Britain could reinforce
its position within the global financial markets, expanding its global footprint without the
need to conform to unnecessary and restrictive EU rules.
The UK might decide to abandon the cap, as the case may be; this could be viewed as
Britain’s golden opportunity to rid itself  of  a measure that it has always strongly opposed.
Those in financial occupations in London and elsewhere will be pleased with this
prospect; many consider Brussels to be incorrigibly antagonistic to free markets, oblivious
as to how accomplishment is actually attained within them. By abandoning the cap Britain
will highlight the fact that there is a fine line between pleasing the crowds and chasing
business out of  town.31 Freedom from the cap could make Britain more competitive,
particularly as against other large financial markets, such as the USA which have not
followed suit. This is evidently crucial; according to a study conducted by the Bank of
England in 2015, since 2013 bonuses have climbed relatively higher in the USA than those
in London.32 The study also underlines the fact that numerous large international banks,
such as HSBC and Barclays, are displeased with the cap because of  its application to
employees more widely (provided a bank has its base in the EU). This makes it more
difficult for them to employ and hold on to high-level employees in competitive cities like
New York.33 There is yet another and perhaps more compelling reason here: the cap does
not appear to function as originally intended. According to the aforementioned Bank of
England study (interestingly conducted a year after the cap was implemented), because of
the bonus cap there has been a growth in fixed remuneration as a proportion of  total
remuneration. In other words, the cap has resulted in bankers’ salaries rising as a result of
firms refusing to cut pay – at present fixed pay makes up more than 50 per cent of  high-
level bankers’ overall pay, up from less than 10 per cent in 2010.34 These are the
unintended and most detrimental effects of  this measure.
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Yet still, given the present political climate, the government might prefer to retain this
EU measure. Even if  one accepts the economic argument for scrapping the cap, the
current political ambiance undermines the impetus for doing so. The continued
uncertainty surrounding Brexit is likely to reduce the urgency to add more ambiguity into
the mix. Popular sentiment, political pressure and general appearances will matter greatly
in this debate. Britain is currently susceptible to systemic uncertainty emerging from
Brexit; this is not the time to appear to soften the existing regime. Rather, the government
might prefer to retain its present system, a system that appears to adopt a consistent
approach to pay within the European continent and that, in turn, plays its part in securing
some confidence within the domestic and international contexts.35 In fact, the increasing
public disarray over Brexit36 might even result in remuneration levels decreasing – not
because of  the legal consequences of  Britain leaving, but due to pressure upon industry
and government to take prudent decisions within prominent and controversial fields,
executive remuneration being a key one here.37 Otherwise we may see London salaries as
well as bonuses rising if  elements of  CRD IV, the EU’s banking remuneration regulations,
are repealed, an alternative that the UK government would undoubtedly wish to avoid. 
2.3 BREXIT AND DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION
Disclosure of  information is said to address corporate governance weaknesses such as
information asymmetry and promoting shareholders’ voices.38 It should be made clear at
this point that one of  the perceived weaknesses in current corporate governance practice
(i.e. the causal link between high pay disparities and company performance) is not yet
proven. The hypothesis that high pay disparities harm company performance has been
debated on both sides by respected academics, scholars and organisations such as the
Trade Union Congress and the High Pay Centre. The first step is to analyse whether
executive pay is too high. The second step is to prove the causal link between high pay
disparities and company performance. The evidence for both is inconclusive to date. A
range of  factors can influence company performance and executive remuneration is only
one of  them. 
In banking, profitability is even more complex with some banks operating in different
jurisdictions and markets. Return on equity, the level of  interest rates, bank concentration
and government ownership are some of  the factors that may influence banks’
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profitability.39 Research into the profitability of  banks in the EU has only been
undertaken recently. This is unusual given that the EU accounts for approximately 25 per
cent of  global GDP. It also has a sophisticated wholesale financial services sector, which
generates over 30 per cent of  the world’s wholesale financial services activity.40 Earlier
studies by Berg et al,41 Pastor et al,42 Lang and Welzel,43 Lozano-Vivas,44 and Dietsch and
Lozano-Vivas45 focus mainly on a small range of  banks in Norway, Sweden, Finland,
France, Germany and Spain. Later research by Altunbas et al,46 Bikker,47 Maudos et al,48
and Schure et al49 covers a broader spectrum of  EU banks. 
Three recent scholarly papers50 have been cited regularly to support the argument that
general executive pay is too high and unrelated to company performance.51 A critical
analysis of  these papers will reveal that there are limitations with these studies. The
common weakness is that all three papers do not take equity incentives into account. The
paper by Cooper et al52 is not about equity incentives but total pay (which includes salary
and bonus). The papers by Philip53 and Florackis and Balafas54 only researched into
newly granted shares and options. Yet, directors are usually incentivised by shares which
have already been granted. Further, the three studies do not take into account of
company size or establish the causal link.55
In the UK, academics are inconclusive on whether executive remuneration led to
distortion of  incentives or whether there was too much emphasis on short-termism.
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Gregg et al56 analysed pay in the UK financial industry. They concluded that, whilst pay
is high in financial organisations, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of
financial firms is not significantly higher compared to other industries. Their results
showed that RBS had the highest total compensation in 2000 amongst the big four UK
banks. By 2006, however, Barclays had the highest total compensation. Gregg et al are not
convinced that the incentive structure in bankers’ pay led to excessive risk-taking. One
must note, however, that their results did not include equity incentive payments. In the
UK, Sir David Walker57 criticised the role of  non-equity incentive payments for not
relating to long-term profitability. Perhaps this explains the focus on cash bonus in Gregg
et al’s study. 
One then wonders why both the EU and the UK regulations (Shareholder Rights
Directive (2007/36/EC); CRD IV; the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups
(Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 and the Companies Act 2006)
ask for disclosure of  directors’ remuneration if  the above causal link is inconclusive to
date. The authors submit three reasons why disclosure of  directors’ remuneration is
important to good corporate governance. First, public trust in companies, especially
banks, was eroded after the financial crisis of  2007–2009. Although the bashing of
bankers and public outcry against bankers’ remuneration have died down, the UK has one
of  the lowest trust levels in businesses in the Global 28 countries. Public trust in
businesses in the UK was 45 per cent in 2017.58 As a comparison, the USA has a 58 per
cent trust rate; France has a 50 per cent trust rate; Spain just pipped the UK with a 46 per
cent trust rate; and Germany has a 43 per cent trust rate.59 The UK’s trust rate has slipped
1 per cent compared to 2016. The general weak score can be explained by the public’s
dissatisfaction towards unfairness in executive remuneration and the tax arrangements of
certain global companies.60 Additionally, recent corporate scandals at BHS, Sports Direct,
Tesco, Rolls Royce and BAE Systems further weakened the public’s trust in companies.
The perception of  corporate entities and the unfairness felt by the public are important,
especially with the uncertainty of  Brexit looming over workers.61 The truth is that the
current political climate calls for social, responsible, stakeholder-led corporate
governance in our society. Executive pay represents a very small proportion of
expenditure for large companies (an estimated 0.6 per cent in the FTSE 100
companies).62 Corporate boards have the difficult task of  balancing the value added by
directors against public sentiment and the overall values of  the company.
The second reason why disclosure of  directors’ remuneration matters is because
London’s appeal as an international financial hub faces stiff  competition from other
European financial centres, which enjoy the single passporting scheme. In total, there are
nine passporting rights covering a range of  financial services. Each passporting right
derives from an EU directive or regulation. For example, a UK-based bank might use a
CRD IV passport to provide corporate advisory services, lending or deposit services to a
business in another EU state. Banks established in the EU or European Economic Area
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(EEA) can establish branches in other EEA countries or provide financial services across
the EEA without the need for further authorisation. Brexit transforms British banks into
third-country banks. Brexit creates significant hurdles for banks in the EU and EEA
when providing financial services in the EU since they lose the single passport
advantages.
The alternative of  obtaining a licence in each EU country is time-consuming and full
of  uncertainties. Not all EU countries provide licences. The scope of  financial services
operating under licences is limited and generally does not carry rights to onward cross-
border trade from the country of  licensing.63 The licence regime is subject to the caveat
that Britain’s regulatory regime is accepted by the EU as ‘equivalent’ to the EU standards.
It can be argued that as long as Britain sustain its current standards under the current
range of  EU directives and regulations the ‘equivalence’ regime should apply. The reality
is that there are three problems. First, a declaration of  ‘equivalence’ can be revoked within
30 days. A declaration can be full or partial, as well as subject to a time limit. Besides, there
is no defined period as to when the European Commission must provide a decision when
assessing ‘equivalence’.64 It took the European Commission four years to decide whether
central clearing counterparties in the USA are equivalent.65 This uncertainty does not
assist banks in planning for the long-term. Secondly, the ‘equivalence’ regime is not
available in certain core banking activities, such as lending, deposit-taking, credit cards
and payments. Finally, and most importantly, there is no agreed definition of  ‘equivalence’
as yet. This is still subject to an agreement between the EU and Britain. Much depends
on how much control the EU wishes to retain over Britain’s regulatory developments and
Britain’s ability to break free of  particularly onerous provisions.66
Finally, disclosure of  directors’ remuneration is important because shareholders’
ability to express dissatisfaction or veto executive remuneration is weak in the UK.
Shareholders of  public companies in the UK have the right to vote on advisory resolutions
about executive compensation. The say-on-pay vote was introduced by the UK
government to increase ‘accountability, transparency, and performance linkage’ of
executive pay.67 The advisory nature of  such votes means that they are mainly symbolic.
Indeed, Ferri and Maber68 demonstrated that the advisory resolutions on executive
compensation had no effect on the level and growth of  chief  executive officer (CEO) pay.
They examined the effect of  the say-on-pay legislation in a large sample of  UK firms by
comparing the determinants of  CEO pay before (2000–2002) and after (2003–2005) its
introduction. Nevertheless, their research revealed that there was heightened sensitivity
towards poor performance, particularly in companies which had very high remuneration.
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 introduced a binding vote on say-on-
pay to shareholders of  quoted companies, but this is only available every three years in
the UK. Using a large sample of  binding and advisory votes in UK companies, Gregory-
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Smith and Mai69 demonstrate that, even with a binding vote, it is unlikely that shareholder
dissent will lead to a reduction in executive pay. The binding votes relate to the election
of  directors, both executive and non-executive, and the approval of  long-term equity-
based incentive schemes. The advisory vote relates to the annual advisory vote on the
Directors’ Remuneration Report. Gregory-Smith and Mai’s results show that shareholders
tend not to use binding votes to express disapproval of  executive pay levels beyond the
amounts merited by firm performance. Recent research by Correa et al70 refutes this.
Their research on both binding and advisory ‘say-on-pay laws in 12 countries shows that
they are associated with lower executive pay levels – only advisory say-on-pay laws tighten
the sensitivity of  executive pay to firm performance. Gerner-Beuerle and Kirchmaier71
examine the impact of  the UK’s 2013 enhanced executive compensation disclosure rules
on shareholders’ say-on-pay votes. Using pay information disclosed by FTSE 100 firms,
they found that shareholders focused on top-line salaries and seem to disregard the
remaining information. 
The binding say-on-pay vote to date is disappointing, although more time and
research are required to provide more data, especially in the UK. The mixed results of
say-on-pay on executive remuneration should not give rise to complete despondency for
three reasons. First, the research by Ferri and Maber72 and Correa et al73 is encouraging
because the advisory say-on-pay resolution has a positive impact on heightened sensitivity
towards poor firm performance. Arguably, the evidence to date shows that most
shareholders, apart from a few cases report in the media, are not too unhappy with the
level of  executive pay. Rather, they are unhappy with the fact that directors should be paid
high wages when the company is performing badly as a result of  excessive risk-taking.
Shareholders are understandably concerned that poor firm performance may lead to poor
share returns. As such, high executive pay is not the main issue. The issues are more about
the sensitivity of  remuneration to company performance and a long-term pay structure.74
Secondly, it appears that say-on-pay has increased dialogues between companies and
institutional investors.75 Large institutional investors will have more time and resources
than small individual shareholders to monitor directors’ remuneration. Finally, the new
UK Public Register of  publicising listed companies which have faced significant
shareholder rebellions or have withdrawn resolutions in 2017 intends to have a deterrent
effect. Although ‘significant’ is not defined in the new directors’ remuneration reporting
regime, it is understood from the Directors’ Reporting Remuneration Guidance 2016 that
it means at least 20 per cent of  votes cast against a resolution.76 Executive remuneration
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continues to be of  interest for some shareholders. In 2017 38 per cent of  resolutions
related to annual remuneration reports or policies received significant votes against or
were withdrawn. Apart from having a deterrent effect, this Public Register has the benefit
of  publicising how a company will respond to shareholders’ concerns, thus increasing
dialogues between the parties. Therefore, disclosure of  information such as directors’
remuneration should allow more transparency and better communication between
companies and individual shareholders. 
The evidence from 2017 shows that some shareholders do utilise the disclosed
information for voting purposes. Nevertheless, one needs to monitor the future
percentages of  resolutions cast against annual remuneration to achieve a more accurate
correlation between disclosure of  executive remuneration and shareholder activism. The
literature to date on shareholder activism casts doubt upon the efficacy of  shareholder
activism due to dispersed ownership in the UK. In 2014, overseas shareholders owned
around 53.8 per cent of  shares in the UK market.77 Dispersed ownership in the UK
makes it difficult for individual investors to monitor companies. With Northern Rock,
144,000 of  the 180,000 shareholders were found to be individual investors with small
shareholdings.78 They lacked information or influence to monitor the board’s
performance. Coupled with short-termism of  shareholders where the average period of
share ownership is six months,79 shareholders face significant hurdles in taking an active
part in monitoring directors.80 The implementation of  the Stewardship Code in 2011 has
increased shareholder participation by 68 per cent.81 Good voting turnout at annual
general meetings (AGMs) does not necessarily lead to better engagement, since
shareholders can purely make noise rather than constructive suggestions. Nonetheless,
shareholder engagement in some UK companies, such as Aviva, AstraZeneca and WPP
during the shareholder spring in 2012 shows that shareholders can play a positive role in
corporate governance by challenging executive pay packages.
2.3.1 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENTS
Disclosure of  directors’ remuneration is thus justified for good corporate governance in
light of  the above three factors. It is also necessary for Britain’s economy in light of
Brexit. The European Shareholder Rights Directive was adopted in April 2017 and Britain
has until March 2019 to implement it. Such implementation is, of  course, not compulsory
due to Brexit. However, UK law already contains similar provisions. Say-on-pay legislation
is incorporated in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the Large and
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment)
Regulations 2013 and the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report)
Regulations 2013. Essentially, quoted banks in the UK must have a binding say-on-pay
resolution every three years and prescribe the requirements of  the annual remuneration
report and the minimum requirements of  the directors’ remuneration policy. The
requirement of  a company strategic report would provide shareholders with a holistic
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picture of  the entire company’s business model, strategy, development, performance and
future prospects. Clause D.2.4 of  the UK Corporate Governance Code invites
shareholders to approve all long-term incentive schemes. Therefore, the direct impact of
Brexit on disclosure directors’ pay is likely to be relatively minor.
There remains the important balance of  attracting talent against a backdrop of  calls
for equality in society. The competitiveness and stability of  Britain’ financial industry are
potentially affected by Brexit. As mentioned earlier, several American and Japanese banks
are already moving or expanding their offices in Frankfurt in light of  the loss of
passporting rights. The increased competition might revive the argument that bankers
need to be paid handsomely to retain talent in London. After all, how can banks in
London attract talent when other European cities or international cities such as Hong
Kong or Singapore are more appealing? Globalisation has without doubt82 increased the
remuneration levels in the financial industry. Research by Gabaix and Augustin83 shows
that between 1998–2003 American firms have grown in size due to globalisation. As a
result of  this growth, executive pay has also increased. High executive pay is argued to be
justified because talent is more important in a globalised world84 and that the ‘scalability’
of  CEOs is different to that of  average employees. Kaplan’s data-driven study supports
the notion that the market for talent determines CEO salary.85 Their high salaries are
justified because they increase the value of  the companies they work for and they can be
dismissed for poor performance. The average term for a CEO of  a Standard and Poor’s
500 company was six years in 2013 in comparison to eight years in 1998.86 Kaplan’s view
contrasts to the established view in corporate governance that executive pay is linked to
company performance.87 In his opinion, the media tends to focus on the very high CEO
pay and corporate scandals when the reality is not as sensational. Over the past 15 years,
the median CEO pay has remained almost the same, but the mean CEO pay has decreased
a great deal. CEO pay is therefore a reflection of  supply and demand in the job market.
Kaplan’s results are supported by a UK study in 2016. A study into the executive pay of
the CEOs of  the FTSE 350 companies showed that the median pay was £1.9 million in
2014. This was a rise of  82 per cent since 2011. At the same time, however, increase of
invested capital was less than 1 per cent.88 Talent therefore drives executive pay.
One can argue that CEOs are only part of  the bigger employee workforce in a
company. Why treat CEOs in a special way? The answer is that there is evidence to show
that CEOs matter in life and death. Two research papers of  201789 support the argument
that CEOs bring positive impact to companies in the long-term. Flammer and Pratima’s
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study shows that there is a causal connection between giving long-term incentives for
executives and improved company performance. In particular, their results reveal that
shareholders’ proposals of  long-term incentives to executives improve both firm value
and operating performance. Company strategies and stakeholder relationships are also
improved as a result of  long-term incentives. The second paper by Edmans et al
reinforces the long-term structure of  executive remuneration. Their use of  ‘vesting
equity’ (the amount of  stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter) leads to
CEOs cutting investment on long-term research and design projects and increasing short-
term earnings. Thus, they call for giving CEOs long-term incentives so that CEOs can
implement long-term investments in research and design. CEOs contracts therefore
affect real boardroom decisions.
Equally, two research papers of  2015 and 201490 show that the departure and death
of  CEOs can have negative impacts on company value and performance. Besides, a
CEO’s decision to introduce the use of  new technology will have a bigger effect in a large
company than in a smaller one.91 The scalability of  average employees is not entirely
dependent on the company size. If  the maximum of  cars an employee can fix is ten a day,
it does not matter whether the company has 500 or 5000 cars. Rewards are thus higher
for strategic and managerial talents than pure labour. 
Nonetheless, the argument ignores the fact that poor strategies and management can
have negative impacts on companies. The financial crisis of  2007–2009 has revealed
several examples of  poor strategies and management amongst certain UK banks.92
Therefore, sensitivity of  executive pay and company performance matters. The advisory
say-on-pay proves to be effective in heightening this sensitivity. Once there is such
sensitivity, shareholders will hopefully scrutinise the CEO’s actions in more detail.
Transparency and disclosure are thus necessary to give shareholders access to information
to make informed decisions. Disclosure of  directors’ remuneration can work both ways.
From a company’s perspective, more information available to shareholders potentially
gives them more ammunition to rely upon at AGMs. Companies should see this not as an
inconvenience, but as an opportunity to open dialogues and discuss and resolve matters
with shareholders. Nevertheless, more disclosure provides transparency which in turn
should increase public trust and investor confidence. 
It is important to note, however, that the disclosure should contain accessible
information which an average person can understand. Disclosing copious amounts of
information is neither sensible nor useful. UK law requires a great deal of  disclosure by
listed companies, as seen above. In the modern era where digital technology is
increasingly popular, it is proposed that such disclosure should be made on digital
platforms or mobile applications for shareholders to access. In late 2015, Jimmy Choo
worked with Equiniti to produce the first digital platform allowing shareholders to vote
online at AGMs. The AGM mobile application was created as a native app (Android and
iOS). The app works by directly integrating with the AGM software, which contains
information of  a physical AGM, such as attendance, voting and presentations. Through
the app, shareholders can ask questions and vote on resolutions. Shareholders’ identities
and credentials are verified. They also need to enter a ‘meeting ID’ code before they can
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vote online. Evidence from this Jimmy Choo online AGM reveals that shareholder
engagement in 2016 was much better than for the physical AGM in 2015.93
Technology can thus improve shareholder engagement and there is interest from
other companies in the development of  online voting.94 Publishing dense strategic and
directors’ reports in a traditional format does not appeal to busy, time-poor investors,
especially individual investors. However, useful information from such reports can also be
fed into mobile applications and be presented in accessible format. Many mobile
applications utilise artificial intelligence such as machine learning and predictive analysis
to monitor and predict users’ preferences according to their search histories. The authors
submit that it would be useful to have a mobile application that can send personalised,
tailored disclosure of  company information, such as directors’ remuneration, strategy and
company performance, to shareholders. Keywords, summaries and links to remuneration,
strategy and performance should be accessible through the mobile app. Paper copies of
reports should still be available for shareholders, but digital technology should allow
shareholders to access such information at their convenience and be able to enjoy a more
tailored format. By remembering and storing a shareholder’s preferences and search
histories, algorithms can personalise the reports.
Ultimately, directors’ remuneration should be decided by company remuneration
committees. It is not for governments to decide the level of  executive pay. Regulation is
often reactive, driven by political will rather than shareholders’ wishes. The American
experience in regulating executive pay for 80 years has taught us that a web of
remuneration schemes was developed as a result of  regulatory arbitrage. In brief, their
attempt to regulate pay was unsuccessful and produced counterproductive payment
schemes. It is right, however, for a government to increase stakeholders’ influence on
executive pay. The Conservative government has not adopted the call for an annual,
binding say-on-pay vote. However, it will introduce secondary legislation to incorporate
more disclosure requirements which will require listed companies to publish their annual
pay ratios between CEOs and employees.95 It also requires companies to explain in their
strategic reports how directors comply with s 172 Companies Act 2006 and have regard
to employees’ interests. The government has asked the FRC to revise the UK Corporate
Governance Code to be more specific about the steps that listed companies should take
when they encounter significant shareholder opposition (likely to be 20 per cent or more)
to remuneration and other resolutions. The tone of  the government’s response suggests
that it will rely mainly on the ‘comply or explain’ style of  the UK Corporate Governance
Code. It is prepared, however, to be more prescriptive and legislate if  the ‘comply or
explain’ style fails to deliver. It is hoped that listed companies will comply with the new
disclosure requirements as legislation can create its own problems. Much depends on the
government’s ability not to bow down to city lobbyists.96 Finally, even if  the disclosure
requirements lead to a reduction of  executive pay through a say-on-pay vote, they only
cure one weakness of  the bigger corporate governance framework in the UK and it might
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not have a lasting effect. The success of  the say-on-pay vote depends largely on
shareholder activism. The fact is that overseas investors own 53.8 per cent of  shares in
UK listed companies.97 Shareholder activism on a yearly basis, voting on executive
remuneration in a dispersed ownership jurisdiction, is thus difficult.98
3 Conclusion
Legally, Brexit will have a limited impact on UK law on executive remuneration. This
article looked at three specific areas of  executive remuneration, namely: the bonus cap;
the clawback of  pay; and the level of  disclosure required by shareholders regarding details
of  directors’ remuneration and the extent to which shareholder approval is needed. A
great deal of  the law set out in EU directives and regulations is already implemented in
UK legislation. Besides, public sentiment for equality in society and the general anxiety
over the Brexit negotiations will probably maintain the status quo: certainly, in the
foreseeable future until the outcomes of  future trade deals are clearer. However, people’s
memories fade with time. Britain needs to compete with other important financial centres
globally in a post-Brexit era. Competition is fierce and talent has become more important.
Incentives are required to attract talent to London’s financial sector. High executive pay
is justified as CEOs’ scalability is different to that of  the average employee. Most
shareholders accept the level of  executive pay, contrasted with the public’s anger towards
unfairness in compensation and distrust of  big companies. Sensitivity of  executive
compensation and company performance is heightened with advisory say-on-pay votes.
Continuation of  this should be pursued as it should encourage shareholders to engage
more with companies, scrutinising CEOs’ actions and decisions, leading to better
corporate governance. Disclosure of  directors’ remuneration is required to provide more
voice to shareholders. An opportunity arises with digital technology such as mobile
applications. They may create better access to such information and personalised services.
European legislation in corporate governance has addressed the issue of  executive
remuneration. Britain now has the choice to retain the status quo, or repeal part or all of
the law on executive remuneration. In practice, much depends on political will and market
forces. Brexit brings both challenges and opportunities to Britain. It is now up to the
government and companies working together for a new Britain after Brexit.
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